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There is substantial evidence from the literature on individual wage
determination that length of service to the firm is an important determinant
of earnings and thus of labor productivity, holding constant employee at-
tributes such as age, sex, and education. Earnings growth associated with
increased tenure is usually interpreted as a reflection of firm—specific
on—the—job training (OJT). In this paper a model of producer technology
consistentwith the hypothesis of firm—specific OJT is formulated and
estimated. Empirical implementation of the model on data for U.S. manu-
facturing provides the basis for estimation of the marginal productivity
of workers classified by length of service to the firm, i.e., of the tenure—
productivityprofile. The parameter estimates also enable us to determine
the effect of recent changes in the tenure distribution (due to changes in
labor turnover behavior) on manufacturing productivity performance.
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(617) 924—3589Recent studies in the literature on individual wage determination
reveal that tenure is an important determinant of earnings, holding con-
stant the employee's total amount of work experience, education, and
personal characteristics such as sex and race- The significance of tenure
in earnings equations is generally interpreted as providing support for
the hypothesis that a substantial fraction of the skills acquired by
workers via on—the—job training (OJT) are firm—specific. It is true
that the high partial correlation between earnings and tenure may be
partly spurious——an artifact of unobserved worker heterogeneity.2 But
the strong association between earnings and tenure is not destoyed by
attempts to control for heterogeneity. For example, wage regressions
estimated by Mincer and Jovanovic3 on two different samples——the National
Longitudinal Survey sample of young men, and the Michigan Income Dynamics
sample of men of all ages——in which an attempt is made to control for
heterogeneity, suggest that more than half of skills acquired on the job
are firm—specific. According to their parameter estimates, a typical
worker would have increased his current hourly earnings more by moving to
his current job a year earlier (holding total time in the labor force
constant) than he would have by entering the labor force a year earlier
(holding time in the current job constant).
The role of specific OJT as a determinant of worker productivity is
recognized to be of even greater importance when one considers the fact
that the tenure coefficient in wage equations captures merely the worker's
private return to investment in firm—specific skills, not the social
return. According to the theory of OJT, the costs and returns of specific
investment are shared (in theoretically indeterminate proportions) by worker
and firm. This implies that the rate of growth of wages paid to the worker
as he accumulates skills will be lower than the rate of growth of hismarginal productivity (MP), which reflects the combined return to
employer and worker. By the nature of the case, the wage equation frame-
work is incapable of providing an estimate of the social return to specific
training; what it can, in principle, provide——assuming that the hetero-
geneity problem can be solved, arguably a heroic assumption——is a lower—
bound estimate of the growth of MP attributable to training.
Although there is ample evidence that firm—specific training contri-
butes significantly to the productivity of labor resources, the specific
training hypothesis has not been integrated or reflected in empirical
analyses of production behavior. Failure to account for specific training
in the analysis of production activity is striking because OJT is, by
definition, integral with the process of production. (Of course, it is the
very integration of the two activities that is the source of many of the
measurement problems associated with training; the process of human capital
formation is "submerged" within production.) Failure to acknowledge the
presence of training in this context is unfortunate in several respects.
First, information about the level and structure of training costs and
returns, which cannot be obtained by any other approach, may be lost.
Second, the representation of technology will, in general, be misspecified,
possibly resulting in distorted estimates of parameters characterizing the
structure of production. The distortion arises from an attempt to isolate
for purposes of analysis two activities (training and production) which
economic agents have found appropriate or efficient to combine. Finally,
the direct analysis of production behavior offers an alternative to wage
equation estimation for the investigation of training issues.
The objective of this research is to formulate and estimate a model
of producer technology consistent with the hypothesis of firm—specific OJT.
—2—The model is implemented empirically using data for the U.S. manufacturing
sector. Firm—specific training is often thought to play a particularly
important role in the market for manufacturing production workers4, who
comprise roughly seventy percent of manufacturing employment. Estimation
of the model enables us to perform tests of the training hypothesis and to
obtain estimates of parameters which identify the tenure—MP profile. More—
over, the implications of specific training for productivity trends in
manufacturing may be assessed.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section I, the general form
of a model of technology consistent with the specific training hypothesis
is developed. This model is compared and contrasted to two other general
classes of production models which have been specified by previous
investigators. In Section II, a specific functional form and estimation
procedure are selected, estimation results are presented and hypothesis
tests performed. Problems of statistical inference associated with the
empirical analysis of firm—specific training are discussed in Section III.
I
The essence of the OJT hypothesis is that firms utilize current
employed resources to augment the future MP of employees. Consequently,
the appropriate representation of the technology of an enterprise which
engages in OJT is a multi—product model of production. Such enterprises
produce intangible investment in human capital as well as ordinary output,
using a stock of human capital (the sum of depreciated past investments)
and other resources. The production possibility frontier (PPF) character-
izing the technology may be written in general, implicit form as
F(Q,IHC,K,SHC,A) =0 (1)
where Q =quantityof ordinary output
IHC =quantityof investment in human capital
—3—K =quantityof physical capital input
SHC =quantity(stock) of humancapital
A =indexof technology
Assume for simplicity that all training is firm—specific. Evolution of the
stock of human capital is determined by past investments in OJT according to
the "perpetual inventory" equation
SHC(t) =I IHC(x)exp[—k(t—x)1 dx (2)
where k is the (presumed constant) depreciation rate of human capital.
This depreciation rate reflects the separations behavior of trained employees
as well as the effects of skill atrophy.
This model of production is formally identical to that formulated by
Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau5 to describe the PPF of the entire economy.
They represent the aggregate production frontier by
F(C,I,K,L,A) =0 (3)
where C =quantityof consumption goods output
I =quantityof investment goods output
K =quantityof capital input
L =quantityof labor input
A =indexof technology
K and I are related by an accumulation equation similar to (2). Just as
physical capital is a produced means of production at the level of the total
economy, so are specific skills produced means of production at the enter-
prise level. In both cases, past decisions to allocate resources to the
production of one output in favor of the other condition the current
availability of inputs. Also, less—than—full utilization of resources
weakens the tradeoff between (human or physical) capital formation and current
production.
Conventional specifications of technology abstract from firms' produc-
tion and utilization of specific human capital. The PPF is written as
F(Q,K,L,A) =0 (4)
where L =totalmanhours employed
It is instructive to compare the index of total factor productivity (TFP)
—4—consistent with the "misspecified" technology (4) with the index consistent
with the "true" technology (1). This comparison enables us to determine the
direction and magnitude of biases in TFP measurements based on the maintained
hypothesis that (4) represents the structure of production.
The rate of growth of TFP is defined as follows:
(PIP) =w —v (x/x)
(5)
where P =totalfactor productivity
Y quantity of i—th output i =1,...,N
share of i—th ouput in value of total output
X3 quantity of j—th input j= l,...,M
v share of j—th input in value oftotal input
and dotted variables indicate differentiation with respect to time. As
Jorgenson and Griliches6 have shown, if the production function is charac-
terized by constant returns to scale, and if the necessary conditions for
producer equilibrium——all marginal rates of transformation between pairs of
inputs and outputs are equal to the corresponding (shadow) price ratios——
are satisfied, this definition of TFP measures the "shift" in the production






The definition of TFP corresponding to the null hypothesis of no specific
training (i.e., equation (4)) is
(P'/P') =(QIQ)-vK(K/K)
-vL(L/L) (7)
The bias in conventional productivity accounting is equal to the difference






We have used the condition that =
VSHC,i.e. that the share of labor in
total input cost equals the share of human capital. It is convenient to
rewrite (8) as
—5—(p'/p') —(Pip)=v([dln(SHC/L)]/dT) —wIHc([dln(IHC/Q)]/dT) (9)
Equation (9) reveals that the conventiot1!i measure of the rate of growth of
TFP overstates the true measure when the growth rate of the stock of human
capital exceeds the growth rate of manhours, i.e., when the stock of human
capital per manhour, or "labor quality", is increasing. The overstatement
is highethe larger is labor's share in total input cost. The conventional
measure understates the true measure when the wth rate of human capital
investment exceeds the growth rate of output. The understatement is greater
the higher is the share of human capital investment in the total (shadow)
value of the firm's production—cum—training activity. The analysis which
followssuggests that [(Q/Q)— (I}iC/IHC)]and [(L/L) —(SHC/SHC)]will
generally have opposite signs at any given moment, implying that the two
sourcesof bias will be reinforcing rather than offsetting. The hypothesis
that they have opposite signs is consistent with the notion of an "equil-
ibrium" skill distribution, which the firm attempts to maintain by acceler-
ating training investment when labor quality declines and vice versa.
Although the multi—product formulation (1) is useful in enabling usto
assess potential biases attending conventional productivity measures,it
cannot provide a basis for empirical research, since investmentin firm—
specific training, and hence the stock of human capital, arenot directly
observable. Development of a model of training—cum—production capable of
empirical implementation requires us to make an assumptionabout the
determinants of training activity. A hypothesis about the determinants
of the firm's "demand" for training may enable us to identify the pathof
training investment and the stock of human capital. It istherefore postulated
that the typical firm has a "standard training program," which consistsof
a sequence of investments in an employeeundertaken at specified points in
his career within the enterprise. In other words, the firm iscommitted
—6—to provide certain training investments as the worker accumulates years of
service. The notion of a standard training program abstracts from
variation in investment activity which might arise due to such factors as
differences in learning ability among new entrants and the stage of the
business cycle. The implications of individual variation in the intensity
of investment will be considered in Section III.
Under the standard training program hypothesis, both the current level
of an employee's MI' and his rate of investment in OJT are indexed by his
length of service (LOS) to the enterprise, or tenure. Similarly, the
distribution of employees by length of service determines both the marginal
productivity of total labor input and the rate of aggregate training invest-
ment; i.e., it determines both the stock and the flow of specific human
capital. If the training program is characterized by a monotone decreasing
(with tenure) rate of investment in the typical employee——a policy consistent
with standard models of optimal human capital accumulation——and there is no
depreciation of skills, individual MP—tenure profiles will be monotone
increasing and concave. As the distribution of employees shifts in the
direction of lower tenure, the stock of specific human capital per worker
falls, and the flow of training investment per worker rises.
The production possibility frontier of an enterprise which has a
standard training program may be approximated by
F(Q,K,L1,L2,. .. ,L,A)=0 (9)
where L1 =employmentin the i—th length—of—service category
I =l,2,...,N
Inprinciple, this formulation captures all relevant information concerning
the firm's past andcurrent training investments. Estimates of NP by
tenuregroup may beinterpreted as ordinates of the tenure—NP profile, and
thus enable us to determine the position and slope of the profile. The
height of the profile at any given length of service indicates the contri-
bution to the stock of human capital by a worker with that length of service,
—7—and the slope of the profile indicates the rate of investment in the
worker.
We therefore propose to estimate a model of producer technology in
which labor is classified by length of service to the establishment. Before
turning to the discussion of estimation procedure and results, it is desir-
able to contrast this model with other models of disaggregated labor in
production. Previous investigators have estimated models of production——
either cost or production functions, or marginal productivity (first—order)
conditions derived from them——in which labor is classified by one or more
attributes postulated to determine marginal productivity. The most common
disaggregation criteria are age, occupation, and educational attainment of
workers. Although these models bear an obvious formal resemblance to a model
of the general form (9), these models are based on assumptions about the
operation of the labor market which are inappropriate to the analysis of
firm—specific training. These differences with respect to assumptions
about labor market structure are reflected in different research objectives.
Previous analyses of labor disaggregated by characteristics such as
age, education, and occupation conventionally assume that the market for
each type of labor is competitive, i.e., the firm can hire all it wants
of each type of labor at an exogenously determined, constant wage rate.
Also, the firm is postulated to be in competitive equilibrium with respect
to each type of labor at every moment, equating the MP of each type to its
wage. The primary objective of these studies is to obtain estimates of
demand elasticities for and substitution elasticities among the different
categories of labor. Knowledge of these elasticities,4ould enable the
analyst to assess the effects on relative employment of policy— or other-
wise—induced changes in the relative prices of different types of labor and,
in some cases, capital.
—8—The assumptions of the competitive labor market paradigm are appro-
priate to the analysis of the firm's demand for labor only if the skills
required for production are completely transferable across firms, i.e.,
only if all training is general. An alternative paradigm, that of the
internal labor market, is needed to account for the behavior of employment
and wages classified by skill when skill is a product of firm—specific
training and experience. The constraints on the wages and employment of
the various skill groups are fundamentally different when skills are
generated by the firm's own training activity than they are when skills
may be obtained on the external market. In the latter case, the firm is
presumably free of employment (quantity) constraints, being able to hire
arbitrary amounts of each type of labor in each period, but subject to N
price constraints, required to pay each type of labor its respective market—
determined wage. Where necessary skills are developed by firm—specific
training——and assuming that the quantity of training embodied in a worker
is determined by tenure——the firm operates under (N —1)employment
constraints: the maximum currently available supply of workers with t years'
experience and training is limited by the number of entrants t years ago.
Only the level of employment of new workers is unconstrained in each period.
It is true that the firm can increase its supply of skilled workers in the
short run by accelerating the training and promotion of workers lower down
in the skill hierarchy, but it is often assumed7 that training is subject
to increasing instantaneous marginal costs, which means that it is more
expensive to upgrade workers rapidly than slowly. This suggests that the
need for workers with different amounts of firm—specific training imparts
an intertemporal interdependence to hiring and employment decisions, in
contrast to the myopic (one—period) character of decisions to employ externally
available labor.
—9—There is also a sharp distinction between the postulated behavior of
wage rates classified by skill when skills are firm—specificand relative
wage behavior when skills are perfectly general. Because specific training
drives a wedge between a worker's NP and his opportunity wage, producers are
not constrained by the external market to pay a worker a wage equal to
his NP at any particular point in his career. Competition among employers
for prospective trainees would function to constrain the expected present
value of wages over the worker's career to equal the expected present value
of his NP. Rather than operating under a regime of N wage constraints——one
for each job classification in the skill hierarchy——the employer operates
under two broad constraints, one on the level and one on the slope of the
wage profile. The height of the profile must be high enoughto attract an
adequate quantity and quality of new entrants; and the rate of growthof wages
must be sufficient to encourage the worker to accept training and promotions.
Changes in external labor market conditions may force employers to adjust
the general level of wages, but not the relative wage structure. It is often
argued in the personnel management/industrial relations literaturethat
employers seek to maintain stable relative wages within theinternal labor
market in order to promote a sense of fairness among employees. There
is evidence that relative (occupational) wage rates among manufacturing
production jobs are extremely stable.
The estimation of static, technical elasticities of substitution and
demand——the principal objective of previous analyses of disaggregated labor
in production——is not the goal of the present research, nor is theeconomic
significance of such parameters clear in a labor marketcharacterized by
intertemporal constraints on the supply of various skills andrelative wages
which do not reflect relative marginal productivity and are not exogenous
to employers.
—10—II
Inthis section we formulate and estimate an econometric model of
producer technology——a cost function——in which labor is classified by length
of service. The estimation procedure to be implemented requires that we
adopt the maintained hypothesis of weak separability between labor and non—
laborinputs. Separability constrains the marginal rate of substitution
betweenany two types of labo]74:o be independent of the level of nonlabor
inputs, and the elasticity of substitution between any nonlabor input and
labor to be the same for all types of labor. It is generally not desirable
to impose separability restrictions a priori. When the labor separability
hypothesis has been subjected to test in previous studies of disaggregated
labor in production, it has usually been rejected. The "stylized fact" is
that more highly skilled labor and capital are complementary inputs, and
both are substitutes for unskilled labor in production.8 Evidently, the
potential bias of parameter estimates arising from inappropriate imposition
of the separability restriction is attenuated if the technology is
specified to have the translog form. According to Chinloy9, the translog
function has the property of "approximate consistency in aggregation. This
implies that little error arises from a two—stage construction of value—
added by forming subaggregates of labor and nonlabor inputs, and subsequently
aggregating the two. This vitiates in large part any error from incorrect
aggregation if separability does not obtain."
Under the maintained hypothesis of separability, there exists a consistent
aggregate index of labor input. it is convenient to begin specification of
the production model with the labor input index. It is assumed that this
index, denoted L*, is a translog index of its arguments:
*(I
in L =B in L + (l/2)w in L1 in L (10)
Ii
Thetransiog may be viewed as a local second—order approximation to any,// tv-i#tiW,/ (
—ii—Symmetry and homogeneity constraints are imposed on (10). Symmetry implies
that w =wj,
for i,j =1,...,N. Parameter restrictions implied by linear
homogeneity, which ensures that an x percent change in the labor services of




Imposingsymmetry and homogeneity constraints by direct substitution into
(10) yields
W -L
in L* B in(L./LN) + in L ÷ i N
2
(l/2)yw1{2 in L. in L. -(inL.) -(inL.)2] (11)
10
Following Chinioy ,wedefine an index of labor quality, Z, consistent with








in Z =inL -inL
*
Substituting the expression (ii) for in L ,weobtain
,'-I
in Z =B.in(Li/LN) + ln(LN/L)+
2 2
(l/2)w[2 in L. in L. —(inL.) —(1nL)1 (12)
The overall structure of production is represented by a translog cost
function, which relates the minimum cost, C, of producing a givenlevel of
output, Q, to a vector of input prices, P, and an index of technology,T:
M
inC =
a0+ a, in Q +ah in h +
(i/2)g in h in+ aT T +g T in h (13)
Allowing for nonzero g permits us to test for nonneutraitechnical change.
Differentiating the cost function with respect to in h' and imposingthe
symmetryconditiong =gh(h,k =1,...,M) we obtain a system of M equations:
—12—( inC)/( in =
ah+g in + ahT h =1,...,M (14)
By Shephard's lemma (which applies to arbitrary cost functions),
(a C)/(ci =
Xh
where denotes quantity of input h. Hence
(inC)/(a in =( C/Ph) (Ph/C) =Xh(Ph/C) =Sh
(15)
where Sh is the share of input h in totai cost. Under the maintained
hypothesis of cnstant returns to scale, the following restrictions on the




These restrictions enable us to eliminate (for example) the Mth equation
and g from the remaining (M —1)equations in (14). The resulting
system of equations may then be written
'1-l
Sh =ah g (Ph/PM) + T h =1,...,M—1 (16)
Estimation of the parameters of the cost function by (16) requires data on
the price of each factor of production. To maintain a consistent accounting
framework, the (implicit) price of each factor is defined as the ratio of






The price of labor corresponding to the quantity index of labor input is
ln PL* =lnCL —inL* (19)
This is related to the conventional definition of the price of labor, labor
cost per hour worked by
in PL* =lnL —inZ (20)
Clearly, our measure of labor quality determines how given total expenditure
on labor input is divided into price and quantity components. By evaluating
the time derivative of (20), it is evident that the change in the price of a
unit of labor equals the change in the price per manhour minus the change
—13—in labor quality (input per manhour). If labor quality increases (decreases)
over time, cost per unit of input has been falling (rising) relative to cost
per manhour.
The appropriate measure of the price of labor to be included in the
cost function and derived factor share equations is PL*, since this indexes
the cost to the firm of employing a unit of labor of constant quality.
Moreover, PL* is more likely than to be exogenous to producer behavior,
since the latter is affected by changes in employment mix as well as changes
in group—specific wage rates.
For purposes of empirical analysis, the cost function was specified
to be of the value—added or net output variety: output is defined as value
added, and only primary factor (capital and labor) prices are included in
the cost function. It is well knownthata value—added specification
is based on the maintained hypothesis of strong separability between primary
and intermediate (energy and materials) inputs. The separability hypothesis
has been subjected to statistical tests and decisively rejected in recent
econometric work. Unfortunately, the data required to generalize the
model to include intermediate inputs were not available for this investigation.
In a two—factor setting, the system of input share equations (16) reduces
to a single equation:
SL =aL+
ln(PL*/ + T (21)
Substituting for in PL* =in —inZ and using the expression (12) for




(1/2) w(2 in L1 in L -(inL)2 -(inL.)2)] (22)
J
Ordinary least squares estimation of (22) yields simultaneous estimates of
the parameters of the labor input (or labor quality) index and cost function
parameters. The equation is exactly identified: the coefficient on the
difference [ln(PL/ —ln(LN/L)j equals g, the coefficient on in(L/ L)
—i4—equals and so forth.
Equation (22) was estimated using quarterly observations on the durable
and nondurable sectors of U.S. manufacturing for the period 196101 to 197604.
Because no regular time—series data on employment classified by job tenure
are available, it was necessary to construct estimates of these series using
"new hires" data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' labor turnover survey,
in conjunction with job tenure data collected periodically in the Current
Population Survey. These sources and the assumptions underlying the
construction of the tenure—group series are documented in the Appendix.
In a nutshell, a perpetual inventory algorithm was developed, and the esti-
mate of the number of employees with n periods' tenure in period t is
proportional to the number of new hires in period t—n. The available
data sources dictated, to a certain extent, the specific partitioning of
employees into tenure groups. After experimenting with several alternative
partitionings, disaggregation into three mutually exclusive and exhaustive
categories——employees with 0—6 months',7—24 months', and 25 or more months'
tenure in the current establishment——was adopted. Further disaggregation
tended to generate unstable estimates of the parameters of the labor
input index, evidently as a consequence of multicollinearity among the
constructed tenure—group series. Together, the three groups account for
roughly a third of employment, on the average.
Three variants of equation (22) were estimated for each of the two
sectors. All equations were estimated using the Cochrane—Orcutt adjustment
for serial correlation of residuals. The estimation results are presented
in Tables l—D (durables) and 1—N (nondurables). Model III represents the
unrestricted form of the labor share equation, corresponding to the translog
index of labor input (linear homogeneity and symmetry imposed). Model II
corresponds to a Cobb—Douglas labor input index, in which all second—order
terms (w12, w13, w23) are constrained to equal zero. Model I corresponds to
—15—TABLE 1—D




































































SSR • 7422E—03 • 5302E—03 4952E—03
* Absolutet—values in parentheses
All equations estimated using Cochrane—Orcutt adjustment for
-First—order serial correlation.
—16—TABLE 1—N






















































rho .8320 .8134 .7954
(11.9) (11.1) (10.4)
D—W 1.72 1.74 1.70
2
R .9631 .9850 .9855
SSR .1063E—02
* Absolutet—values in parentheses.
All equations estimated using Cochrane—Orcuttadjustment
for first—order serial correlation.
—17—the null hypothesis of no specific OJT, since the price of labor is defined
as labor cost per manhour; this hypothesis implies the following restriction
on the parameters of the Cobb—Douglas index:
B ln(L1/L3) + B2 ln(L2/L3) + ln(L3/L) =0
To test the hypotheses that (1) the labor index is Cobb—Douglas, and
(2) labor input is equivalent to total manhours, we performed F—tests on
the three specifications. This consists of calculating the change in the
sum of squared residuals from imposing restrictions; dividing this change
by the sum of squared residuals of the unrestricted equation; and dividing
numerator and denominator of this ratio by the appropriate number of degrees
of freedom (number of parameter restrictions and residual degrees of freedom,
respectively). The resulting test statistic is distributed, asymptotically,
as F(v1,v2), where v1 is the numerator degrees of freedom and v2 is the
denominator degrees of freedom. Performing the test for Models II and III
indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis of a Cobb—Douglas index,
in favor of the more general translog specification, for either sector.
F(3,55) =1.29for durables and 0.28 for nondurables; the critical value
of F(3,55) at the .95 level of significance is 2.78. Imposing the Cobb—
Douglas restrictions results in a neg1igibläecrease in the fraction of
variance explained by the independent variables.
The hypothesis that labor input is equivalent to total manhours is
decisively rejected for both sectors. The test statistic F(2,58) equals
7.87 for durables and 28.6 for nondurables, compared to a critical value
of 5.03 at the .99 significance level. Besides providing superior overall
goodness of fit, Model II yields estimates of individual parameters
considerably lower in variance than does Model I. Except in the case of
the capital—labor substitution parameter (g =—g)for nondurables,
the differences between point estimates of the parameters common to Models
—18—I and II were not statistically significant. This suggests that failure to
include information about the tenure distribution in the specification of
technology does not result in seriously distorted estimates of parameters
characterizing the technology.
Before examining the labor index parameters and implied relative
marginal productivity estimates in detail, we consider the behavior of the
cost function implicit in our estimates of equation (22). In order to
qualify as a well—behaved neoclassical cost function, a cost function must
have the properties of monotonicity and convexity. The translog function
does not satisfy these conditions globally; we therefore check to establish
that they are satisfied for the sample space on which the model is estimated.
A sufficient condition for monotonicity to obtain is that the fitted cost
shares for all factors be positive in each period. This condition is satis-
fied for all variants of the model for both sectors (fitted values are not
reported here). Convexity of the cost function is guaranteed if the own—
price elasticity of demand for each factor is negative. Own—demand
elasticities and Allen partial elasticities of substitution are related to
estimated model parameters as follows:
ED =(g/s)+ s —1 i =L,K
ES =(/(sj.s))
+ 1 i,j =L,K;i j
ES .= (g.+ 2 —s.)/s.2 i =L,K ii ii 1 11
where =fittedvalue of share of factor i in total cost
EDi =own—priceelasticity of demand for factor i
ES =Allenelasticity of substitution between factors i and j
Estimates of ES and ED. vary, with s. and s.,, over the sample period; convexity
was satisfied in each period. Estimates of the substitution and demand
elasticities implied by Models I and II, for the first, middle, and last
quarter of the period, are presented in Table 2. Although the estimates
are well—behaved, the substitution and demand elasticities are quite small,
—19—TABLE 2
ESTIMATES OF SUBSTITUTION AND PRICE ELASTICITIES IMPLIED BY
LABOR SHARE EQUATION PARAMETER ESTIMATES
ES ES ES ED ED
KL KK LL L K
D u r a b I.e s
Model I
196101 .0476 —.3083 —.0074 —.0064 —.0413
196804 .3096 —1.239 —.0773 —.0619 —.2477
197604 .1548 —.8474 —.0282 —.0239 —.1309
Model II
196101 .0982 —.5974 —.0162 —.0139 —.0844
196804 .3030 —1.251 —.0734 —.0591 —.2439
197604 .1772 —.9452 —.0332 —.0280 —.1492
N ondu rab1es
ModelI
196101 .1736 —.6343 —.0475 —.0373 —.1363
196804 .2613 —.7736 —.0883 —.0660 —.1953
197604 .2921 —.7910 —.1079 —.0788 —.2133
ModelII
196101 .1264 —.4436 —.0360 —.0280 —.0934
196804 .1840 —.5681 —.0596 —.0450 —.1390
197604 .2451 —.6434 —.0934 —.0676 —.1775
ESdenotesAllenelasticity o-Fsubstitutionbetween iandj, Iii,j= K,L
ED denotes own—price priceelasticity c-F demand.
J
—20—relative to those obtained by other reserchers. For example, the "consensus"
point estimate of the elasticity of demand for labor is of the order —0.3.
have not been able to determine why the estimated elasticities are substantially
smaller than one would expect.
We turn now to the focal point of the empirical work, the analysis of
estimates of the parameters of the index of labor quality. The analysis
has two objectives. The first is to obtain estimates of the relative marginal
productivity of the three tenure groups of employees, and to perform
significance tests on the estimated productivity differentials. The second
is to examine the behavior of the labor quality index over time, and to
consider the implications of the latter for trends in aggregate labor
productivity.
Since labor input is postulated to be weakly separable from nonlabor
inputs, comparisons of the marginal productivity of the three tenure groups
may be made entirely in terms of the labor index parameters. The elasticity
of output with respect to the quantity of the i—th group's labor services is
in Q)/(dlnL) =(( inQ)/(lnL)((lnL*)/(in L1)) =
((c)in Q)/(inL)(B1 +wJ inL)
The output elasticity measures the percentage change in output attributable
to a one percent change in L. The marginal product ofL1, i.e., the absolute
change in output resulting from a unit (one manhour) change in L1, is obtained
by multiplying the elasticity by the average product, QIL1:
MP =((dinQ)/(c1lnL*))(Q/L1)(B +Wj in L)
Hence the ratio of the marginal productivity of group i to that of group k is
'ik =i'k
=[(Bk+iw1 ln L)/(Bk +/Wkj in L)](Lk/Ll)
J -,
Thisreduces to (Bi/Bk)(Lk/Lj) in the Cobb—Oougias case.'l3 and RMP23——the
ratios of the marginal productivities of each of the two "junior" groups
tothat of the "senior" employees——were computed for each quarter for the
Cobb—Douglas variant ofthe labor index(Model II). For the nondurabies
—21—sector, the inequalities 0 < RMP13 < RMP23 .1were satisfied in every quarter.
These inequalities also held in all quarters for durable goods industries,
with the exception of three quarters in which R}1P23 slightly exceeded unity.
In order to obtain summary measures of the relative marginal productivity
of the three tenure groups, sample means of RNP13 and RNP23 were calculated.
These are presented in the top panel of Table 3.These figures may be inter-
preted to signify that, for example, workers with 0—6 months1 tenure in
durable goods industries are 24.0 percent as productive, on the average,
as workers with over two years' experience in their current establishment.
Although the magnitudes of the marginal productivity ratios constitute
presumptive evidence of the unequal contributions (per manhour) of the
various tenure groups, formal tests of the statistical significance of the
productivity differentials were conducted. The (absolute) difference in
marginal productivity between two tenure groups is proportional to
DMP1. =(B/L)
—(B/L.)
Since this is a linear combination of normally distributed variables with
known variances and covariance, calculation of the t—ratio of DMP is
straightforward. T—ratios were calculated for the two pairs of "adjacent"
tenure groups, i.e., groups 1 and 2, and groups 2 and 3. :For the durables.
sector, DMP12 was significantly greater than zero at the 97.5 percent level
(t(64) =2.00)in 41 quarters (out of 64); DMP23 was significantly greater
than zero in 33 quarters. For nondurables, DMP12 was always sigfificantly
greater than zero, and DMP23 was in 43 quarters. Sample average t—values
are displayed in the bottom panel of Table 3; all pass the significance test
easily.
Because workers with different amounts of tenure exhibit differences in
marginal productivity, variation in the tenure distribution of employees
induces variation in the average quality of utilized labor services. The
logarithm of the index of average labor quality corresponding to the Cobb—
—22—TABLE 3
SUMMARY RELATIVE MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY STATISTICS
Durables Nondurables












note: See text for definitions of variables. Figures
reported represent sample means.
—23—Douglas input index is
in Z =(Bln(L IL)) +(B ln(L IL)) +ln(L IL) 1 i 223 3
The labor quality index was evaluated, using point estimates of B1 and B2,
for the sample interval 196101 to 197604. A time—series plot of a four—
quarter moving average of the index (normalized to unity in 196804) is shown
in Chart 1. Miindexof aggregate labor market tightness, Wachter's UGAP
measure, is also indicated. The chart shows that the durables and nondurables
quality indices exhibit marked and similar cyclical variation, although
the durables series is characterized by somewhat wider fluctuations. As
expected, labor quality moves countercyclicaily, rising as firms curtail
hiring in response to weakening sales, declining as firms dilute their
experienced workforces with new entrants during recoveries. Short—term
changes in labor input per manhour may be quite pronounced: labor quality
changed by as much as 12.9 percent in durables, and 11.4 percent in durables,
within six quarters.
The secular behavior of labor quality has direct implications for long—
term trends in total factor productivity (see eq. (9),p. 6). Labor quality
tended to decline in both sectors over the sample period: the average
quarterly decline was —.048 percent in durables and —.107 percent in nondurables.
These figures correspond to cumulative reductions in quality of 3.3 percent
and 8.3 percent, respectively, over 16 years. To determine whether the
secular decline in quality was statistically significant, the logarithm of
labor quality was regressed on a time trend and a constant. The t—value of
the trend coefficient was 1.77 for durables and 5.46 for nondurables,
indicating significance at the .95 level (t(64) =1.67).Because both
beginning and ending quarters of the sample interval were periods at or near
cyclical troughs in macroeconomic activity, the average rates of change do
not appear to be seriously distorted by sample period definition; if anything,



















































































































































































































































































































 underestimate of the quality decline.
—26—III
The estimates of the parameters of the index of labor
input enabled us to measure the MP of each of the various
tenure groups. In this section we discuss some problems
of attempting to make inferences about the shape of a
"representative individual" MP-profile from these estimates
of MP by tenure group. In essence, all of these problems of
inference are caused by the possibility of unobserved worker
heterogeneity, combined with a process of selection (by firms,
and/or self—selection by workers) which determines which
workers will accumulate tenure. It is likely that our
inability to control for various unobserved characteristics
results in an overestimate of the slope of the "representative
individuals "MP-profileby the derived relative marginal
productivity estimates. We shall consider the effect of two
"types" of heterogeneity: heterogeneity with respect to human
capital investments undertaken prior to employment in,current
firm, and heterogeneity with respect to the intensity of
investment within the current firm.
Due to data limitations, labor input is classified by a
single characteristic --lengthof service to the establishment
--inthe model of production underlying the empirical
investigation. The human capital theory of marginal productivity
determination implies that tenure is not the only attribute
which determines the user value of labor services. In
particular, education and general training acquired in
previous employment are usually postulated to augment the MP
of workers. In principle, if there are n characteristics which
determine the productivity of labor resources, a complete
n—way classification is required for the consistent measurement
of labor input. If the classification scheme is of less than
order n, and some of the attributes by which labor is not
classified are correlated with those by which it is classified,
estimated differences in MP between cells in the classification
will reflect differences in attributes not "controlled for".
There is an omitted classification criterion, analagous to an
omitted variable in regression analysis.
—27—Although it is not possible to cross-classify labor input
by tenure, previous experience, and education in our data set,
extraneous information concerning the correlation of tenure
with education and age (from which previous experience may be
inferred) may enable us to evaluate the influence of these
omitted criteria on the estimated productivity differentials.
Such information is available in the form of two-way classif i-
cations of employees by (1) tenure and education, and (2) tenure
and age, derived from the Current Population Survey. Estimates
of average educational attainment and average age of employees
in four lenght—of—service categories were calculated from
these crosstabs and are presented in Table .Thefirst column
of the table indicates that there is no clear association
between tenure and educational attainment. This finding appears
to warrant rejection of the hypothesis that part of the estimated
returns (in the form of higher productivity) to increased tenure
should be attributed to differences in education across tenure
groups.
In contrast to education, age exhibits a strong positive
association with tenure. Moreover, the differences in average
age between tenure groups always exceed the differences in
tenure (measured as differences between midpoints of the class
intervals). The implication is that workers with more tenure
in their current firm generally also have more previous work
experience. Rough estimates of differences in average age,
tenure, and previous work experience between "adjacent" tenure
groups are as follows:
group age tenure previous exper.
difference difference difference
7—12 m./0—6 m. 2.1 yrs. 0.5 yrs. 1.6 yrs.
13—24 m./7—12 m. 1.7 0.8 0.9
over 25 m./13—24 m. 10.6 5.3 5.3
It is likely, then, that workers with greater length of service
had higher endowments of general human capital, and higher MP,
at the time they entered the firm than workers with low tenure.
Viewed from a different perspective, workers with greater
previous experience are more likely to "survive" to advanced
service than those with less prior experience. These differences
—28—TABLE 4
AVERAGE YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED AND AVERAGE AGE
BY LENGTH OF SERVICE TO CURRENT EMPLOYER
Average years of
1 2
Length of service school completed Average age
o— 6months 12.5 yrs. 29.6 yrs.
7 —12months 12.4 31.7
13 —24months 12.9 33.4
Over 25 months 12.3 44.0
Notes: 1. Education data refer to males, 25 years old and over, employed
in January, 1978.
2. Age data refer to all workers (male and female), 16 years old
and over employed in January, 1973.
Source: Crosstabulations from Current Population Surveys, January 1973
and 1978. All workers assumed to be at the midpoint of their
respective education or age class interval.
—29—in MP at time of entry would, in themselves, tend to cause the
estimated productivity differentials to overstate the returns
to specific training. However, this overstatement would be
attenuated if older, more experienced workers tend to invest
a smaller fraction of their time in specific OJT --behavior
consistent with optimal life—cycle human capital accumulation.
The justification for this statement will be provided by the
following discussion, in which the implications of heterogeneity
with respect to the intensity of specific investment are
analyzed.
The specification of our model of training-cum-production
was based on the hypothesis of a standard training program, i.e.
a sequence of training investments which is the same for all
entrants. Under this hypothesis, the estimates of MP by tenure
group reflect the slope of the (uniform across workers) tenure-
MP profile. Suppose we relax the assumption of uniform invest-
ment profiles, and assume that workers are free to choose among
a continuum of investment intensities, i.e. they may choose the
fraction of time at work to be devoted to investment. Now if
the probability that a worker would attain a given length of
service were independent of his intersity of investment, we
could still interpret our estimates of MP by tenure group as
indicating the "average" of the slopes of the various MP—tenure
profiles. But the assumption of independence has little appeal.
On the contrary: ceteris paribus, individuals with greater
expected completed length of service (CLS) --forwhatever
reason ——shoulddevote more time to firm—specific investment.
In a cross—section of individuals, the people with higher tenure,
or uncompleted length of service, will tend to have higher CLS.
Thus, workers with higher tenure will have invested more intensively
at every point in their careers than individuals with lower tenure.
In the presence of heterogeneity with respect to investment
intensity, labor input should be classified by intensity of
specific investment as well as by its duration (tenure) in the
specification of labor input. Since intensity of investment is
an omitted classification criterion positively correlated with
tenure, the estimated returns to increased tenure capture the
—30—returns to higher intensity as well. Similarly, omission of
the relevant but unobservable variable "intensity" in wage
equations leads to upwardly biased tenure coefficients.
Although the intertsity on an individuals' investment is
unobservable, we have postulated that this intensity is deter-
mined by his expected CLS, which, in turn, is inversely related
to his probability of separation. Thus, if one could identify
an attribute or set of attributes of workers which indicated or
determined expected CLS (or the propensity to separate), this
could be used to "control" for heterogeneity in investment
behavior.
Two recent studies have adopted the strategy of including
variables postulated to reflect separations propensity in
individual wage regressions in order to purge the tenure co-
efficients of the effects of heterogeneous. investment. Both
studies utilize longitudinal data and implicitly assume the
determinant of investment intensity to be stable over time, so
that past observations on the behavior of the individual can
be used to control for heterogeneity. Mincer and Jvanovic11
include a "previous mobility" variable, in addition to education
and linear and quadratic terms in both total work experience and
tenure, in log—wage regressions for NLS young men, NLS mature
men, and MID men of all ages. The effect on the tenure
coefficients of introducing the previous mobility variable into
the equation varied form sample to sample. In the young men's
sample, it had no effect: "Prior mobility is not related to
current wages and does not affect the tenure coefficients...
Appartly differences in early mobility of young men are not
indicative of future differences in specific capital investments
nor do thay capture differences in wage levels which are
positively related to the length of current tenure."12 Introduction
of the prior mobility variable into the regression for mature
men "cuts the linear (tenure) term in half and reduces its
signigicance,"suggesting that "repeated mobility at an advanced
stage of the life—cycle is an indicator of persistant turnover,
• ,,l3 denoting little investment in human capital. As one might
expect, in the wage equation for MID men of all ages "the
—31—inclusion of prior mobility variables reduces the tenure slope
by close to 20 percent." This implies tht"heterogeneity biases
the tenure —wageslope coefficient upward by about 25 percent."14
Bartel and Borj as15 also estimate earnings functions on the
NLS mature men's data set, but they attempt to control for
heterogeneity with respect to specific investment behavior in a
different way. Instead of introducing an additional right—hand-
side variable to control for heterogeneity, they specify the
dependent variable to be , where is current earnings and
Y is imputed earnings in the first year of the life cycle. (The
initial--earnings imputation is made using data on initial occupa-
tion.) By analyzing wage growth rather than wage levels they claim
to "net out individual differences that are unobserved but affect
,,l6 the individual s earnings throughout the life cycle. Although
substituting lifetime wage growth for wage level in an earnings
equation probably does control for some aspects of unobserved
heterogeneity, it is not at all obvious that it controls for
characteristics which determine specific investment behavior;
controlling for previous mobility appears to be a superior
procedure for accomplishing this. Bartel and Borjas find that
tenure is a highly significant determinant of earnings growth
of mature men; that is, it is a highly significant determinant
of their current earnings, holding initial earnings constant.
Unfortunately, they don't report results for a comparable wage
level model, so it is not possible to assess the effect,the tenure
coefficient of controlling for initial earnings.
The attempts by Mincer/Jovanovic and Bartel/Borjas to control
for unobserved variation in the intensity of specific investment
are implicitly based on the hypothesis that the differences
across individuals in characteristics which determine investment
behavior are permanent differences. To the extent that investment
heterogeneity is an artifact of permanent (or relatively stable)
differences in individual characteristics (e.g., tastes) ,inclusion
of additional information in wage equations may help to attenuate
bias in tenure coefficients. But recent theoretical work by
Jovanovic17 suggests that an individuals' desired intensity of
investment may also be determined by sheer chance, i.e. by the
—32—quality of his "match" with his current employer. This result
emerges from a model of permanent job separations in which the
intensity of on-the-job specific training and on—the—job search
are endogenous. Jovanovic assumes that there exists a nondegener-
ate distribution of a worker's productivity across different
employers, the nondegeneracy of this distrbution being due to
the assumption that the quality of the worker-firm match differs
across prospective matches. In his model, the quality of the
match determines the worker's productivity upon entering the firm.
Once employed, the worker devotes a fraction of his time, I, to
specific OJT and a fraction of his time, S, to on-the-job search.
These fractions are endogenous: the model determines the evolution
of 1(T) and S(T), where T indexes tenure on the current job. The
following equilibrium conditions are yielded by solution of the
model:(l)"Separation probabilities regarded as a function of job
tenureare uniformly lower for those who are well matched, for two
reasons: workers that are well matched spend less time searching
for alternative work, and when they do receive alternative offers,
they are less likely to accept them."18(2) Well matched
individuals spend higher fractions of time investing (at any
tenure), because (by (1)) they have a lower probability of
future separation.
This theory has disturbing implications for our ability to
control for heterogeneity of investment behavior in wage equations
or other applications. For the quality of the worker-firm match
is not merely unobservable; it is also likely to be uncorrelated
with any observable individual attribute.
—33—APPENDIX
Construction of Length—of—service Distributions
of Employees from Labor Turnover Data
Empirical implementation of the model developed in this paper requires
time—series estimates of the length—of—service distribution of employment.
Regular time—series data on the tenure distribution are not available.
In the absence of such data, it is necessary to construct these series
using the perpetual inventory technique, by which means we attempt to
make inferences about the current tenure distribution on the basis of the
past history of the gross flow of workers into employment.
The data base for the perpetual inventory algorithm includes monthly
data on the number of "new hires" in an industry, derived from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics' Labor Turnover survey. New hires are, for the most
part, "temporary or permanent additions to the employment roll of persons
who have never before been employed by the establishment." These employment
accessions are distinguished in the turnover survey from "rehires," i.e.,
additions to the roll of former employees recalled by the establishment.
The tenure distribution of employees in an industry in period t is
related to the past hiring history of the industry by the following set of
identities:
EMP(n,t) =NH(t—n)*s(n,t) n =1,...,w
where EMP(n,t) =numberof employees with n months' tenure in period t
NH(t—n) =numberof new hires in period t—n
s(n,t) =probabilitythat a worker hired in t—n will remain
employed("survive") until t
w=maximumobserved length of service
it is evident from this set of equations that given the (known) path of new
hires, the problem of estimating tenure—distributions reduces to the problem
-Al-of estimating the "survival probabilities" s(n,t).Estimation of survival
probabilities is feasible because, although regular serieson the tenure
distribution do not exist, direct observations of thedistribution are
available for five dates during the period 1963—1978. Undercertain
assumptions concerning the survival probabilities and the observed
distributions, these data, in conjunction with the new hires data, enableus
to construct high—frequency series on employment classifiedby length of
service.
The available distributions are based onresponses of employed persons
to the question, "When did [respondent] start working at hispresent job
or business?," a supplementary question included in the Current Population
Surveys (CPS) of January 1963, 1966, 1968, 1973, and 1978. Forwage and
salary workers (which include the vast majority of manufacturing workers),
"a job is defined as a continuous period ofemployment [as defined below]
with a single employer, even though a personmay have worked at several
occupations while working for that employer." A period of employment is
considered "continuous" if there have been "no interruptionsexcept for
vacations, temporary illness, strikes, short—term layoffs (less than 30
days), and similar temporary factors." A representative tenure distribution
(that of males employed in durable and nondurablemanufacturing at the time
of the 1978 survey) is shown in Table A—l. As indicated, the classintervals
of the length—of—service distribution are 0—6 months, 7—12months, 13—24
months, and so forth. The percentages of all employees (male and female)
in each of the first three class intervals, at eachsurvey date, are
presented for the two sectors in Table A—2. Also shown are theaverage
tenure distributions, in which each cell is computed as the simpleaverage
of the corresponding cells from the fivesurvey tabulations.
Two important assumptions were made to permit construction ofa time—
-A2-TABLE A—i
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF MALE EMPLOYEES
BY PERIOD WHEN CURRENT JOB STARTED:
JANUARY, 1978










































Source: Unpublished BLS crosstabulation based on January, 1978 Current
Population Survey
-A3-TABLE A2
PERCENT OF EMPLOYEES IN THREE LENGTH—OF—SERVICE CATEGORIES,
SELECTED DATES 1963—1978,
AND ESTIMATED AVERAGE PROBABILITIES OF REMAINING EMPLOYED
0—6 MONTHS 7—12 MONTHS 13—24 MONTHS




1963 11.9 7.0 7.3
1966 14.5 7.7 8.6
1968 14.8 7.5 11.3
1973 14.8 6.6 9.4
1978 15.2 8.4 10.5
average 1963—1978 14.2 7.4 9.5
Estimated average probability
of remaining employed for






1963 11.7 7.2 8.3
1966 14.4 8.1 8.2
1968 16.0 7.9 10.0
1973 15.4 6.3 10.2
1978 15.4 8.4 10.9
average 1963—1978 14.6 7.6 9.5
Estimated average probability
of remaining employed for
specified length of time:
.679 .374 .233
-A4-series of tenure distributions. First, it was assumed that the survival
probabilities were independent of calendar time, i.e. that s(n,t) =s(n)
for all n. This assumption is analagous to the common assumption of constant
depreciation rates in the construction of capital stock series. The second
assumption was that the average of the published CPS distributions represents
the average tenure distribution for the entire period spanned by the job
tenure surveys (January 1963 —January1978). Because the surveys were
conducted at almost regular intervals throughout the period, and general
economic conditions varied considerably from one survey date to the next,
the average of these distributions should be a reasonable approximation
to the average length—of—service distribution for the entire period.
Given these two assumptions, the estimation of survival probabilities
proceeds as follows. The number of employees with n months' tenure in
period tis
EMP(n,t) =s(n)NB(t—n)
and their share in total employment is
SHR(n,t) =(s(n)*N}i(t—n))/EMP(t)
where EMP(t) r.ENP(n,t)
The expected value of SHR(n,t) over the 1963—1978 period is assumed to be
equal to the corresponding average share in the CPS tabulations, CPS(n):
E[SHR(n,t)] =E[(s(n)*N(t—n))/EMP(t)]=CPS(n)
where E[ Irepresentsthe mathematical expectation operator. Factoring out
s(n), which is assumed constant, and rearranging terms,
s(n) =CPS(n)/E[NR(t—n)/EMP(t)}
This was the equation used to calculate the survival probabilities. In a
sense, this procedure consists in benchmarking the new hires data to the
infrequently observed tenure distributions. It is appealing because it
eliminates systematic biases in the turnover data which are known to exist,
and it abstracts from differences in employment levels reported in the
-A5-household and establishment (turnover) surveys.urviva1 probabilities were
calculated separately for the durables and nondurables sectors, for the first
three tenure categories distinguished in the published tabulations: 0—6
months, 7—12 months, and 13—24 months. These estimates are shown in Table A—2.
The estimated survival rate for a particular group is, of course, an
average of the survival rates of its members. For example, the survival
rate of the 0—6 month group is an average of the rates of workers with
0 months', 1 month's, 2 months', etc., tenure. In order to obtain more
precise estimates of the tenure distribution, the survival rate within the
0—6 month group was specified to decline at a constant monthly rate (corres-
ponding to a constant monthly conditional probability of separation), such
that the average of the monthly rates equalled the estimate for the entire
group .The"monthly" survival rates were obtained by numerically
solving the following expression for q:
(1/7) * qm=s(0—6)
Ut
wheres(0—6) is the average survival rate of workers hired 0—6 months ago,
and qm is the survival rate of employees hired "exactly" m months ago,
m =0,1,...,6. As for the 7—12 and 13—24 month groups, the average survival
rate for each group was simply imputed to all persons in the group, i.e.,
no allowance was made for within—group variation in survival rates.
Time—series estimates of the number of employees in a given length—of—
service category were obtained by multiplying lagged new hires by the
appropriate survival rate; this was performed for the three groups specified.
The number of employees with greater than 24 months' tenure was computed as
a residual, by subtracting the sum of the estimates of employment in the
0—6, 7—12, 13—24 month categories from the total employment figure.
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